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In-depth · EU CO₂ regulation · Jun 8

The EU 2035 battle shifts ground:
easing rules for combustion cars, passing the bill to the grid

The Commission wants to placate automakers with flexibility, and seven countries have jointly pushed back. A grid study moves the debate from the environment to economics: EVs are the missing storage piece in Europe's energy transition, and the money saved by loosening the rules is simply shifted from automakers to the power system. Below, we use data to unpack three things: how the policy debate is splitting, how the grid numbers add up, and where Chinese automakers should place their bets.

Sources: electrive · ecomento · T&E / Fraunhofer ISI study
010,000 units
EVs missing from Europe's roads in 2040 after targets are weakened
0seats
Additional peaking power plants needed to cover the grid gap (about 13 GW)
0GW
Shortfall in solar installations, 2025-2040 (approx. -37%)
0€100m
Annual fuel savings for Europe from EVs if targets are held

On the surface, the debate is about whether to ban combustion-engine cars in 2035; underneath, it is about who bears the cost of Europe's energy system. Understand three things and you understand this round of wrangling.

Assessment 01

The argument has shifted from climate to grid economics

The seven countries opposing the rollback tie electrification to energy security; arguing in terms of money is harder to refute than appeals to climate responsibility, and more likely to shape the final legislation.

Climate → economy
Assessment 02

The savings from relaxed rules are illusory

The cost doesn't disappear; it just moves from carmakers' books to the power sector: EUR 4 billion more in grid investment and 150 more peaking plants a year.

+€4 billion / yr
Assessment 03

Chinese automakers need asymmetric bets

Set the product cadence on the assumption that relaxation is likely, and treat V2G and battery reserves as a low-cost upside option. Betting wrong on product hurts sales; betting wrong on the option only sinks R&D costs. The downside risk is inherently asymmetric.

2032 V2G mandatory
01 / policy split
Seven-country showdown, with Germany caught in the middle

The Commission's "automotive package" from month 12 last year split member states into two camps. Opponents of easing insist on the 2035 zero-emission floor, supporters want flexibility, and the compromise hides a gap of 90% versus 100%. Behind this split are differences in industrial bases. Countries with cleaner power and strong electrification supply chains want to keep the pressure on, while those strong in combustion engines want to slow the pace.

Seven countries against easing vs three seeking relaxation
EU member state bloc · joint letter to the Environment Council
▸ The camp opposing a relaxation links electrification to energy security: with oil prices high, cutting fossil fuel dependence has become a fiscal issue, not just a climate slogan. A seven-to-three split appears to favor the opponents of relaxation, but Germany's ambiguous vote carries enough weight to leave the final outcome open. Berlin is unwilling to side fully with the ambitious camp, yet will not let combustion cars keep winning by default.
90% real cuts, 10% covered by credits
Fleet emission-reduction structure after 2035 · compromise option
▸ Some combustion cars could still be registered after 2035 using credits, but that 10% would have to be made up with clean fuels, green steel or small-car super-credits, which are widely seen as hard to offset in practice. The EPP group has gone further and called for scrapping the credit system and making a straight 90% cut. This looks stricter but in fact leaves a legitimate path open for petrol and diesel passenger cars. The same 90% can be read as either loosening or tightening.
Seven-country alliance
Denmark · France · Luxembourg · Netherlands · Portugal · Spain · Sweden
Hold 2035
T&E
Commissioned Fraunhofer ISI to cost the grid impact; calls for mandatory V2G
Targets maintained
Germany
Wants flexibility, yet opposes super-credits for small cars and fleet quotas
Ambiguous stance
ACEA / Italy, Czechia
Calls to weaken targets and relax PHEV and transitional arrangements
Calling for relaxation
EPP group
A genuine 90% cut required with no credit system
Keep combustion cars

In fairness to the deregulation camp: their concerns are real

EVs in Europe are still pricier than comparable combustion cars, and with subsidies phased down in many countries, uptake among low- and middle-income buyers has stalled. The public charging gap in Southern and Eastern Europe is a hard constraint: the targets are set, but the cars don't sell. PHEVs may indeed be the more realistic transition in areas with weak infrastructure. What the relaxation camp fears is that mandatory targets end up as "fines for automakers, consumers who won't pay and a hollowed-out industry". These are not concerns to be waved away. But relaxation doesn't solve them; it merely shifts the cost from automakers' books to the power bill, where it lives on elsewhere.

02 / Grid economics
The savings from deregulation are illusory; the bill simply moves elsewhere

The Fraunhofer ISI study for T&E is the first to translate "loosening" the targets into a balance sheet for the power system. Two caveats: it is a scenario calculation commissioned by an environmental group that strongly backs keeping the targets, so it is safer read as advocacy material; and grid investment pressure does not come from cars alone, as heat pumps, industrial electrification and data centres are all pushing up demand. Even after these two discounts, the directional conclusions from the figures below still hold.

Holding the target saves 27.9 billion a year; weakening it costs 4 billion a year in subsidies
Annual net impact on Europe's power and fuel systems · Unit: EUR 100 million/year
▸ On one side are EUR 27.9 billion in annual fuel savings, on the other EUR 4 billion a year in extra grid investment. Cutting the targets essentially shifts the power system's balancing costs onto future infrastructure budgets. The two figures are of different orders of magnitude: the consumer savings secured by keeping the targets are roughly seven times the extra grid spending from weakening them. Laid out plainly, the money saved by "giving automakers relief" falls far short of what the power system would pay.

EVs are the grid's "continental-scale sponge"; loosening the rules amounts to removing that sponge

Those 49 million EVs could have absorbed surplus power into their batteries during wind and solar peaks and fed it back at times of peak demand. Without them, the grid's capacity to absorb green power drops sharply: wind and solar output has to be curtailed at generation peaks, curtailment rises by 25%, and 6 TWh of clean power is wasted every year. Pressure on grid investment does not come from cars alone, as heat pumps and industrial electrification are also driving up demand, but EVs are the most readily available source of additional flexibility: they grow naturally with the vehicle fleet, sit at the point of consumption, and need no dedicated siting or construction. Every additional EV sold with bidirectional charging gives the grid another unit of free distributed storage; every one not sold means that unit must be replaced by centralised, fossil-fuelled peaking plants that require costly new construction. This is the logical thread that pulls the debate away from climate ethics and back onto the balance sheet.

Reserve capacity needs an extra 13 GW
Weakened vs maintained targets · additional firm generation demand
▸ Without battery buffering, the grid has to meet peaks with firm generation, equivalent to building 150 more peaking plants. Reserve requirements rise by about a third, and most of these plants burn fossil fuels. That is the irony: easing the rules for combustion cars would force Europe to burn more fossil fuels to fill gaps in the grid, running directly against the original aim of ending its dependence on fossil fuels.
37% less new solar capacity installed
Cumulative new solar PV, 2025-2040 · unit: GW
▸ Without flexible storage, the grid's ability to absorb solar hits a ceiling, investors lose the incentive to build new plants, and the equivalent of 51 GW of capacity simply evaporates. This is a classic case of demand-side signals feeding back into supply: without batteries that can soak up surplus green power at any time, solar output cannot be sold, so capital naturally stops flowing into new plants.
The grid cost of weaker targets: at a glance
Baseline: current CO₂ targets maintained; figures below are net changes if weakened as ACEA demands
EV fleet (2040)
-49 million units
Distributed storage resources shrink
Grid reserve capacity
+13GW
≈150 peaking power plants; reserve +1/3
New solar installations
-51GW
2025–2040, approx. -37%
Annual clean power losses
+6TWh
Curtailment rate up 25%
Additional annual grid investment
+€4bn
Thicker cables, more transformers
Annual fuel savings (targets maintained)
€27.9bn
Locked in once the target is met
Same set of indicators: the cost of two targets compared
Darker colour = greater system pressure in that scenario · Severity indicative (not absolute values)
▸ Put the five indicators on one heat map: under the maintained targets the colours are mostly light, while under weakened targets the whole map turns dark. Grid flexibility, renewable investment and physical grid infrastructure all come under pressure and deteriorate together. That is the hallmark of systemic risk: it tightens across every link of the power system at once, and looking at any single point will underestimate it.
Clean power losses rise alongside curtailment rates
The renewable energy cost of weaker targets
▸ 6 TWh of clean power is wasted every year, with curtailment 25% above the target level: green power that is generated has no storage to absorb it and has to be cut off. It amounts to calling for a green transition while pouring away clean power already generated, a loss on both the books and climate targets.
Knock-on effects of weaker targets
From fewer car sales to higher grid costs · causal chain
▸ Removing 49 million vehicles sets off a four-stage chain: more backup capacity, shrinking solar, rising curtailment and higher grid investment. Every link costs real money. The key to this chain is that EV batteries can't be replaced. They are flexible storage spread across millions of households that grows with the vehicle fleet. The alternatives, peaking plants and grid expansion, are centralised, expensive and still burn fossil fuels. Take away the first, and only the costlier second can fill the gap.
03 / Strategic outlook
Mandatory V2G and Chinese automakers' asymmetric bet

Turning EVs into grid assets takes more than vehicles: most new cars still don't support bidirectional charging. Policy is filling this gap through mandates, and Chinese automakers must work out which side to back. Rather than hedging evenly, they should identify priorities and place asymmetric bets.

Key milestones: from the PV starting point to the 2040 assessment
EU CO₂ and grid policy timeline
▸ Mandatory interoperable bidirectional onboard chargers from 2032 are a key step in turning EVs from one-way consumers into qualified energy storage units.
Policy and technology at a glance: key anchors to remember
Key parameters for overseas product planning and compliance assessment
Zero-emission requirement for new cars takes effect
Year 2035
0 g CO₂/km, the point of contention
Mandatory bidirectional charging
Year 2032
T&E position: interoperable V2G
Fleets formally cut emissions
90%
Remaining 10% relies on credits; hard to achieve
Super-credit threshold
4.20 m
Small EVs below this: Germany opposes
Anti-relaxation camp
7 countries
Joint push to defend the 2035 pathway
Existing-fleet assessment window
Year 2040
When grid and EV benefits materialize on the books
The cost of betting wrong is asymmetric
Downside risks of two types of decisions by Chinese automakers
▸ Getting the product timeline wrong hurts current sales. Getting a technology option wrong only sinks one R&D budget. The safer course is to set the timeline on the assumption that rules will "most likely be relaxed" and treat V2G readiness as a low-cost upside option. This is the advantage of option thinking: a small outlay holds a position. If the bet pays off, the business can expand from selling cars to selling grid flexibility services. If it doesn't, the loss is capped at a manageable R&D spend.
One-way consumer or grid node?
Two identities of the EV · depending on bidirectional charging
▸ Whether an EV has a bidirectional charger determines whether it is merely an end point that consumes power or an asset that can feed power back and take part in grid dispatch. In reality, the vast majority of new cars still support only one-way charging, which is why regulators want to close this gap by mandate in 2032. Otherwise, however many cars there are, they will be a load on the grid rather than a buffer.
Action priorities under an asymmetric bet
Further right = more urgent · action priorities for Chinese automakers going global (illustrative)
▸ First, plan product and pricing timing on the assumption that the rules are likely to be eased. Next, build in architecture interfaces for bidirectional charging and leave room in battery management. Retrofitting once mandatory requirements take effect is the most expensive option. Getting the order wrong has real costs. Adding bidirectional charging after a platform is finalized often means redesigning the electrical architecture, at several times the cost of building it in from the start.

V2G is a long-dated option today, not a ready-made asset — but positions need to be staked out early

Bidirectional chargers only become mandatory in 2032. Electricity market access rules and battery warranty limits on bidirectional cycling have yet to be sorted out, and this business of selling grid flexibility is built on Europe's distributed power markets, which have no direct counterpart in China's centrally dispatched grid. So "preparing for both outcomes" is correct but empty advice. The cleaner play is an asymmetric bet: plan product and pricing cadence on the likely relaxation, and keep V2G and bidirectional charging know-how as a low-cost upside option. Whoever first turns the EV from a means of transport into an energy node gets the ticket to the next round of rules.

Action 01

Align product cadence with the relaxation scenario

Plan product and pricing cadence on the assumption that flexibility will most likely be adopted. Don't sacrifice current competitiveness for a mandatory target that is not yet settled; put limited resources on the more certain side.

Main bet
Action 02

Bidirectional charging built in at the architecture level

If bidirectional charging interfaces and battery management headroom are built in at the platform design stage, enabling the feature once 2032 becomes mandatory only takes a software update, at near-zero marginal cost. Retrofitting after the architecture is frozen costs an order of magnitude more.

Low-cost option
Action 03

Keep pace with power market rules

Keep a close eye on Europe's V2G grid-connection rules and on how battery warranties treat bidirectional cycling. These are preconditions for turning technical readiness into revenue from grid services. Once the rules are clear, companies that prepared early can move in first.

Monetization prerequisite

At its core, this debate is about the EU designing, at the top level, who pays for the power system. Cutting CO₂ targets will not make the costs disappear; it only shifts them from automakers' compliance bills to grid infrastructure bills, to be spread across society year after year. For automakers betting on Europe, understanding this ledger matters more than calling the policy winds correctly at any given moment.